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also that this abolition of seals could be more efficiently handled by the
legislature, on the ground, suggested in this connection, that "departure
from the common law creates exceptions and execeptions breed con-
fusion. '32 In view, however, of the criticism of Briggs v. Partridge
and the almost unanimous approval with which the cases overruling it
were received, it is hard to understand why the Court of Appeals, if
it could not abolish the orthodox rule, should have attempted to justify
it."' Two grounds were given-the first that "thousands of sealed
instruments must have been executed in reliance upon Briggs v.
Partridge," that "many times seals must have been used for the express
purpose of relieving the undisclosed principal from liability"; and
second, that different periods of limitations apply to sealed and unsealed
contracts. As to the first, it can be no more than a guess that
"thousands of instruments" were so made, and it would seem that the
justification of the continued existence of the doctrine of respondeat
superior-distribution of economic losses-should require the same
result as where the contract is not under seal. As to the second, it is
evident that the same objection could be raised against the previously-
discussed rule of partnership; but it is significant that no such cases
seem ever to have arisen in New York; and should one arise the court
could either call it a simple contract, governed by the six-year statute,
or could follow the South Dakota court in saying that seals were
unimportant save as determining which period of limitation applies.3"
Of the policy behind Briggs v. Partridge it seems more accurate to
say that it "is an arbitrary, unreasonable rule, which never accom-
plishes any good and is used only to prevent the administration of
justice.135 And it is submitted that the Court of Appeals might at
least have placed on it the stamp of their disapproval and called on the
legislature directly to do what they did not feel justified in doing.30
THE %"AUTHORITY" OF AN AGENT-DEFINITION
Definition. The "definition" of a term, whether technical or other-
wise, is a matter to be determined by usage and convenience. It is not
a matter that is determined for us, once and forever, by divinity or by
nature or by some objective reality. The concept expressed by the
word "stove" is at least as variable as are the objects which the word
is used to denote. "Usage" is variable with people, place, and time;
our notions of "convenience" are likewise variable and are likely to be
quite ill-founded as well.
The American Law Institute has undertaken the tremendous task
' Crane, op. cit. supra note 4, at p. 36. Cf. also I Williston, op. cit. sec. 219;
Evans v. Wells (1839, N. Y. Sup. Ct) 22 Wend. 324, 339, 340.
, Cf. Briggs v. Partridge, supra note I, at p. 363.
Gibson v. Allen (x9o5) xg S. D. 617, io4 N. W. 275.
'Lagumis v. Gerard, supra note 5, at p. 473.
MFor the legislative attitude see Shephard, Real Estate Dummies (1925) 73
N. Y. L. JouR. 298.
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COMMENTS
that is briefly, but somewhat erroneously, described as the Restatement
of the Law. The performance of the task requires not only a knowl-
edge of all the rules of law, variable and uncertain and conflicting
as they are; it requires also a language in which to state them. This
means large numbers of words, used so as to create in the minds of
readers a concept somewhat like that in the mind of the draftsman.
It means that each word must be defined, either in the "re-stating"
document or elsewhere. It means that throughout the "re-statement" a
term must be used uniformly in accordance with the selected definition.
To be successful with the legal profession and with the public, the
selection of a definition must be made from among existing usages.
Whenever such existing usage is wholly departed from, an entirely
new term should be coined. This is done with great freedom in other
sciences; but it should be done rarely, if ever, in any statement of the
law. This limitation of the draftsman to existing terms and to existing
usages does not make his task easier; it makes it much harder. The
task of a maker of a "dictionary" is merely to record usages, all of
them indicating their time and place and the number and character of
the users. It is not his business to use a term so as to convey a speci-
fic concept; it is rather to explain all the possible concepts that other
persons have used it to convey. The task of the American Law
Institute, however, is to choose and to use a term so as to convey a
particular and unmistakable concept. In one aspect this is a choice
between different terms; in another it is a choice between different
concepts now commonly expressed by a single term. From the usages
collected in all the dictionaries it must choose one, even though several
of these usages may be (as they frequently are) equally general and
equally good as mere English language. By some formal definition
it must indicate which usage it has adopted; and it should show
definitely that it has excluded the other usages.
"Usage" provides the materials; the actual selection therefrom is to
be determined by practical "convenience." This is a matter of opinion,
and opinions are bound to differ. Compromise is necessary, and
mistakes are inevitable; but the success of the Institute's work will
depend largely upon the wisdom of the choices made. The choice of
a particular usage should depend upon the extent of its distribution,
particularly among those administering the law, its clearness and
simplicity, the dearth of other available terms, the existence of other
terms to fill other needs. It should not be left wholly to the feelings
or the instinct of a particular draftsman. The decisive question ever
to be borne in mind is: Will those who hereafter administer and
explain the law understand the term and in fact use it as defined? If
they will not, the choice of the Institute is a failure.
Law. A law is often defined as a rule of human action. The pur-
pose of law is generally, but not always, to induce certain types of
conduct on the part of human individuals and to discourage other
types. This is merely one of the possible bases of definition. No
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attempt will be made here to consider the various possible definitions
of law, but a tentative choice will be indicated.
The question that the individual constantly puts to his lawyer is:
What will be the action of the officers of society, judicial and
administrative, on a given state of facts? This is true, whether the
facts in question are in the past or in futuro. The client may put his
question in the form "What shall I do"; or he may report "Here is what
I have done." In either case he asks "What will society do about it ?"
Therefore it is suggested that
A statement of "the law" is a statement of the rules by which the
action of organized society with respect to individuals can be predicted.
A statement of what that action (affirmative or negative) will be, on
specified facts now existing, in all, or in part, for one individual and
against another, is a statement of the "legal relations" of those two
individuals.
"Facts" may affect the action of society or they may not; if they do,
they may be described as "operative," otherwise as "inoperative." The
first step -in the definition of a legal term should be to determine
whether it is to be used to denote a "fact" or to denote some "legal
relation" consequent upon facts.1 If used to denote a "fact," the next
step is to decide whether it is to denote a fact that is "operative" in
some particular way, or to denote a fact wholly regardless of any
possible legal operation. Thus, the term "promise" has been defined
by some as a certain kind of expression by one person to another,
wholly regardless of whether it is "binding" (whether society will do
anything by way of enforcement). Others define it so as to require a
"binding force," and call the non-binding expression a "pollicitation."
Again, the term "contract" can be used so as to denote any expression
of agreement by two persons; or it may be defined as any such expres-
sion of agreement that will be enforced by law. Again, the term
"consideration" might be defined as any agreed equivalent exchanged
in fact for a promise; or as any such equivalent that is operative to
cause the enforcement of the return promise.
Authority. I. It is largely accidental that the 'vord "authority" is
here chosen for definition; but it affords excellent opportunity for
demonstrating a method of definition. It is sometimes used to denote
both facts and legal relations, both the acts (expressions) of the
principal and the resulting effect of those acts upon .the action of
society as between principal and third persons and as between principal
and agent. It seems desirable to avoid this double usage. The first
suggestion to be made here, therefore, is to limit the denotation of the
term to "facts" alone. Hence,
Authority denotes one or more facts.
2
" For definitions of these terms see Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology
(igig) 29 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 163.
'It will be considered below whether or not these facts must be "operative,"
although not every possible operative effect will be considered. Various specific
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II. The next step is to classify facts and to determine which ones
fall within the term "authority." Facts, whether operative or inoper-
ative, may be:
i. Conduct of a person (acts and forbearances).
2. Other events (physical changes, excluding human conduct).
3. Other facts (neither conduct nor physical changes).
Basing the choice upon existing judicial usage, the term "authority"
should be restricted to human conduct only, with one possible addition
falling within class 3; viz., certain written documents. The definition,
therefore, now becomes
Authority consists of human conduct or such conduct accom-
panied by certain written documents.
III. The next question is What conduct and Which documents.
The choice here is not quite so easy. It must be made after a com-
parison of specific instances drawn from experience. We should con-
sider both the purpose of the conduct and its juristic result. Now, the
outstanding feature of Agency is the fact that an Agent can change the
legal relations of his Principal with other persons. The short way of
expressing this is to say that the Agent has "Power." Consider the
following cases, with respect to the purpose of the conduct and also
with respect to the resulting power to change the principal's legal
relations with third persons.
(a) P tells A to sell a chattel. P's conduct here (his statement) is
an expression of a purpose to put A in such a position that he can affect
P's property interest. P may not have a definite concept of "power";
but in almost all cases he has a practical notion of property, of sale, and
of representation by another. If P has such a purpose, it is clear that A
has the power of an agent; and this is true even though A may not have
known this. P's statement is A's authority. Therefore,
Authority may be human conduct intended to create legal
power.
(b) P tells A to sell a chattel, accidentally omitting the word "not."
A reasonably understands what was said, and sells the chattel to X. It
was not P's purpose to create power in A; and yet he has done so. The
sale is valid. Did A act within his "authority"? The answer should
be yes. The authority was P's voluntary, intended conduct. It is not
material whether X knows of this conduct. Hence we may say that
instances will be given; but many additional useful instances will doubtless occur
to every reader, further testing the "convenience!' of the definition chosen herein.
The chief question is believed to be whether the term should be so restricted
as to denote "operative" facts only, to denote action by a principal that creates
legal power in the agent. Must the agent be able to "bind" the principal in order
that "authority" may be said to exist? If yes, then "authority" is a fact creating
the legal relation of power-liability between agent and principal, power in the
agent and liability (Hohfeld's term) in the principal. If "authority" be limited
to denote such "operative" facts alone, then one or more legal relations will be
included within its connotation and these relations would have to be worked out
in complete detail.
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Authority may be conduct reasonably understood by A as the
expression of a purpose to create power.
(c) P puts A in charge of a store with definite oral instructions not
to sell an article in the show case. A thereafter sells the article to an
innocent purchaser. The sale is valid. A had legal power, and yet we
say that A acted outside of his "authority." P's conduct was such that
X, the buyer, was caused reasonably to believe that A had authority.
Therefore, the law is that P's conduct created legal power. A's act
was legally operative even though it was beyond his "authority." We
say that he had "appareit authority." This means that there was no
real or actual "authority." It is not A's power that was merely "appar-
ent"; he had power as real as any power ever is. Therefore,
Conduct is not "authority" if it was not intended to be and A
understood that it was not.
(d) P delivers to A a document that plainly says that A shall have
certain power. P did not have the purpose of creating such power,
however; he negligently failed to express himself accurately or to under-
stand the written words. If A reasonably understood that P's purpose
was to create the power, the case is like (b). We say that A had
"authority." But if P had clearly expressed to A what his purpose
really was, the case is like (c). A has power, but no "authority."
Evidently we regard P's conduct objectively, his unexpressed. purpose
being immaterial. Not so as to A, however. His "authority" depends
upon his subjective understanding of P's objective conduct. There is
no "authority" unless we have both P's conduct, objectively considered,
and the actual subjective understanding of A.
(e) P writes and mails a letter to A telling him to sell P's chattel
on certain terms. Before A receives this letter, by mere coincidence A
contracts in P's name to sell the chattel to X on the specified terms. A
then receives the letter, and also a telegram from P cancelling it. In
cases of this sort, it is reasonable to expect a holding that the contract
does not bind P. If so held, A has no authority and also no power:-
no "authority," because A did not suppose that there was any; no
"power," because no conduct of P had caused X to suppose there was
"authority."
(f) P writes to X: "My chattel is for sale to you on such terms as
you and A may agree upon." X then writes to A, who knows nothing
of P's letter: "I offer $5oo for P's chattel. Are you willing to accept
this offer as P's agent"? A replies: "As P's agent, I accept." Here
there is a contract. No ratification by P is necessary. A had legal
power. It seems best, however, to say that he had no "authority" from
P. The reason for giving A legal power in this case is the same as that
existing in (c). It is that P has made representations to X leading
him reasonably to believe that P intended A to have power. Of course,
if X had communicated P's letter to A, it would have been an "author-
ity" and A's action would have been within his authority. It is quite
possible so to define "authority" as to include P's uncommunicated
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letter to X. This would unnecessarily complicate the definition, how-
ever. The case would seldom happen and there is no presently estab-
lished usage including such a case.
(g) At earlier common law a married woman could not create power
in an agent. (Various persons may be so disabled under our present
law.) Suppose such a person should tell A to sell her property for her.
It would usually be said that A had her "authority" even though he had
absolutely no power. If we adopt this usage, "authority" may consist
of facts that are not operative. We could, perhaps without causing
trouble, define it otherwise and deny that A had either "authority" or
power. Probably this should not be done, however; consider the fol-
lowing illustrations: (i) P tells A orally to sell Blackacre. Suppose
that a statute makes this oral statement inoperative. It would never-
theless be usual to say that A had oral "authority" from P, even though
he had no legal power. (2) P, mistakenly thinking that he is an owner,
gives A a "power of attorney" to convey. Here it would be said that
P has authorized A to convey; and yet A has no power to convey. The
definition below will be so worded as to be consistent with this.
(h) P, husband of A, deserts her without cause. A has legal power
to bind P to pay for supplies. This is not like (a), because P expressed
nothing. It is not like (b), for the additional reason that A did not
suppose that P had authorized her to buy. It is not like (c), for the
further reason that X, the grocer, did not suppose that P had authorized
her. A certainly has power, and there certainly was no authority.
(i) A conveys Blackacre to P, and the latter fails to record the deed.
A then fraudulently conveys to X, an innocent purchaser for value, who
records his deed. P was at first the "owner," but now X is "owner." A
had legal power; but he certainly had no authority. There was no
conduct of P expressing such purpose, and neither A nor X supposed
that there was.
Case (h) supra is generally treated under Agency. Case (i) gener-
ally is not. Whether or not they should be so treated depends upon the
convenient definition of "Agency." We deal here only with what is
"authority."
(j) A legislature passes a charter of incorporation. This creates
certain powers in incorporators. The legislative action is their author-
ity. A certified copy may often be called their authority, but it is not
so; it is merely evidential. If the legislature did not act, such a certi-
fied copy would create no power. Doubtless the official legislative rec-
ord books might be an "authority," like the document in (d) supra.
IV. Definition, and Comment.
Authority, in the law of Agency, denotes an oral or written com-
munication from the principal to the agent, expressing an actual
intention that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf in one or more
transactions with third persons, or causing the agent reasonably to
believe that such was the principal's intention.3
' One cannot state all the law of a subject in a single definition; nor is it possible
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Comment: Authority differi from Power: Authority is a fact;
Power is a legal relation. Authority is conduct of the principal, includ-
ing either oral or written communication to the agent; Power is neither
conduct nor a document. Authority may create Power, but not always;
Power may be created by Authority, but may also be created by other.
operative facts. Authority denotes merely the factual transaction
between Principal and Agent; Power expresses the concept of possible
future changes in the legal relations of the Principal with third persons.
Authority merely describes a historical event; Power predicts possible
events in the future.
The test of Authority is objective, not subjective, as concerns the
Principal. His conduct must be an expression of intent; the subjective
intent need not actually exist. [Cases (b) and (d) ].
The test is subjective, not objective, as concerns the Agent. If he in
fact knows that the Principal did not intend him to have Power, there
is no Authority, even though he may have legal Power as an agent.
[Case (c) ]. Further, if there has been no communication to A and he
knows nothing of P's expressions of intention, there is no Authority,
although here also there may be legal Power. [Cases (e) and (f)].
The term "apparent authority" means that there is in fact no author-
ity, but that the conduct of the Principal leads the third person with
whom the Agent deals to believe reasonably that there was authority.
In such cases, the Agent by acting beyond his authority has legal power
to bind the Principal.4  [Case (c)].
Just as legal power may exist without any authority in fact, so also
conversely may there be a factual authority without any legal power.
[Cases put in (g)].
The voluntary "conduct" of the Principal may consist in the prepara-
tion and delivery of a written document. What is commonly called a
"power of attorney" is such a document. Such written documents are
frequently referred to as the authority of the Agent. X will say to A:
"Show me your authority." Whereupon A produces his documentary
paper. There is no harm in this usage. The document is not in itself
"conduct"; but it is the permanent evidence of the conduct. It should
be noted that such a document standing alone is totally inoperative.
There must be voluntary conduct (writing, delivery, etc.) to make it
operative. When such conduct takes place, the document is one of the
facts (not the sole one, but perhaps the most important one) by which
the conduct is to be interpreted. A. L. C.
to define one term without using other terms that themselves need definition.
Such terms are "power," "communication," "intends," and "legal relations."
For definition of "power," see loc. cit. supra note .
4 The term "apparent authority," as it has been used, has been justly criticized.
Very likely it should be abandoned, although one of the chief objections to it
disappears when a clear distinction is made between "authority' and "power." If
the term "authority" does not always connote "power," as in (g) supra, there may
also be cases of "apparent authority" without any legal.power.
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